COMMENTS
THE EMERGENT FEDERAL COMMON LAW
OF LABOR CONTRACTS: A SURVEY OF
THE LAW UNDER SECTION 301
Section 301 of the Taft-Hartley Act' confers upon the district courts
of the United States jurisdiction over "suits for violations of contracts"
between employers and labor organizations without regard for diversity
2
of citizenship.
The Supreme Court in Lincoln Mills,3 overcoming its earlier doubts concerning the constitutionality of the section,4 upheld section 301 as a grant
of federal power to regulate the enforcement of collective bargaining agreements. The Court ignored the legislative history which suggested that Congress
merely intended to remove the common law impediments to bringing suit
against labor unions. 5 Rather, the Court found in 301 a mandate to "fashion"
6
from the national policy a federal law of the collective bargaining agreement.
7
The Court's decision caused immediate concern. One problem involved
creating a wholely new federal common law of labor contracts, and determining the sources from which that law would be derived. Justice Douglas'
opinion suggested that the express provisions of the National Labor Relations
Act, the policies of that act, and compatible state law, all applied with judicial
1 29 U.S.C. §185 (1958).

2 29 U.S.C. §301 (a): "Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor
organization representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this
chapter, or between any such labor organizations, may be brought in any district court
of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the amounts in
controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties."
3 Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
4 See Association of Westinghouse Employees v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 348 U.S.
437 (1954) (Frankfurter, J.). For a summary of the constitutional issues involved, see Textile
Workers Union v. American Thread Co., 113 F. Supp. 137 (D. Mass. 1953) (Wyzansky, J.).
5 See Meltzer, The Supreme Court, Congress,and State Jurisdictionover Labor Relations,
Pt. II, 59 CoLuM. L. Rv. 269, 274 (1959), and materials cited therein.
6 In view of Justice Frankfurter's constitutional objections to section 301, this construction was probably required. It should be noted that there is little in the legislative history
to support the Court's view, and that the Court itself carefully omitted references to this
history in this part of the opinion.
7 See, e.g., Bickel & Wellington, Legislative Purposeand the JudicialProcess: The Lincoln
Mills Case, 71 HARv. L. REv. 1 (1957); Aaron, On FirstLooking intb the Lincoln Mills
Decision, ARBrrRATION AND THE LAw-PRoCEEDINGS OF THE TWELFm ANNUAL MEETING NATIONAL AcADEMY OF ARBnrrRATORs 1 (1959); Feinsinger, Enoforcement of Labor

ments-A New Era in Collective Bargaining,43 VA. L. REv. 1261 (1957).
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inventiveness, would supply the necessary rules of decision. Justice Frankfurter dissented, objecting that the majority imposed upon the federal courts
"the task of applying a whole industrial code that is yet in the bosom of the
judiciary."s Allied with the problem of source for the new law is the translation of contract doctrines formulated in other areas of law into rules governing
the collective agreement. The Court's language has suggested, at times, that
the labor field presents problems so unique as to justify the creation of a
specialized "industrial jurisprudence." 9 Critics have suggested, however,
that the learning embodied in traditional contract doctrines provides persuasive
analogies readily adaptable to the labor contract.X0 Both problems, source
and the emphasis to be placed upon traditional legal rules, are continuing
themes underlying litigation under the section.
The purpose of this comment is to trace the development of federal rules
of substantive law under section 301. The bulk of litigation under the section
has centered around jurisdictional problems beyond the scope of this comment, with the doctrines of state-federal preemption, Board primary jurisdiction and judicial competence over contract actions creating a complex
mosaic of competing forums." However, the judicial gloss placed upon the
ability to bring suit under the section and the actions which will be entertained
justifies treatment of these problems.
I
In litigation under section 301 the courts have construed the jurisdictional
grant strictly. Suits between employers and labor organizations brought
12
under the section must be based upon a contract between the parties.
Both parties must meet the statutory definitions of employers or labor
1
organizations under the National Labor Relations Act. 3
8 Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 465 (1957).
9 See note 130 infra and cases cited therein.
l0 Cox, The Legal Nature of Collective BargainingAgreements, 57 MICH. L. REv. 1, 14
(1957). Justice Frankfurter dissenting in Lewis v. Benedict Coal Co., 361 U.S. 459, 475
(1960), said in this connection: "There is no reason for jettisoning principles of fairness
and justice that are as relevant to the law's attitude in the enforcement of collective bargaining agreements as they are to contracts dealing with other affairs, even giving due regard
to the circumstances of industrial life and to the libretto that this furnishes in construing
collective bargaining agreements."
11 For an analysis of the jurisdictional problems created by section 301, see Meltzer,
supranote 5.
12 Aacon Contracting Co. v. Association of Catholic Trade Unionists, 178 F. Supp.
129 (E.D.N.Y. 1959); Sun Shipbuilding & Dry-Dock Co. v. Marine Workers Union,
95 F. Supp. 50 (E.D. Pa. 1950) (inter-pleader to determine which of two unions entitled
to check-off fund); Local 33, Hod Carriers Union v. Mason Tenders, 187 F. Supp. 737
(S.D.N.Y. 1960) (no jurisdiction to entertain declaratory judgment of rights in jurisdictional
work dispute).
Suits between unions under section 301 present special problems, and the contractual
requirement has been modified accordingly. See Comment, 69 YALE L. J. 299 (1959).
13A. H. Bull Steamship Co. v. National Maritime Eng'rs Beneficial Ass'n, 250 F.2d
332 (2d Cir. 1957) (Supervisors' union).
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In Retail Clerks Int'l Ass'n v. Lion Dry Goods, Inc.,14 the district court,
applying the contract requirement, refused to entertain a suit based upon
a strike settlement which in its view was not the type of contract enforceable
under section 301. The settlement agreement provided for the restoration
of the strikers to their jobs and authorized the union to engage in organizational activity upon the employer's premises. The company subsequently
refused to permit the union to solicit in the company cafeteria during the
lunch break, and transferred two of the strikers to new, but equivalent sales
posts. The court's refusal to hear the union's suit for breach of the agreement
may be explained upon technical grounds. Section 301 in terms applies to
suits brought by unions "representing employees in an industry affecting
commerce." The union in this case did not represent the employees either
at the time of the strike or on the date of the agreement, although it had
been the bargaining agent earlier.
Other courts have not construed the contract requirement so restrictively,
and have entertained suits based upon strike settlement agreements. 15 The
language of section 301 does not expressly limit the type of agreement which
is actionable to the "usual" collective bargaining agreement. In Lincoln
Mills, the Supreme Court disregarded the legislative history which later
persuaded the court in Retail Clerks. The Court's approach suggests that
any contract between an employer and a labor union may be the basis of a
301 action. Section 301 is based upon the premise that responsibility in labormanagement relations is promoted by the enforcement of labor contracts.
Moreover, the failure to enforce such agreements not only disrupts stable
bargaining and working relationships, but also creates suspicion and distrust
between the parties. These considerations persuasively urge that where there
is a continuing relationship between the parties, all their agreements should
be enforceable under section 301.
These considerations may be inapplicable, however, where agreements
with non-representative unions are involved. The act expresses a strong policy
favoring the administration of the collective bargaining agreement by the
majority union. Enforcement of agreements with non-majority unions may
derogate from the authority of the bargaining agent and interfere with the
bargaining agent's exclusive right to establish the terms and conditions
of employment. The Retail Clerks case also suggests that the terms of such
agreements may conflict with the Board's power to control the representation
machinery by creating rights to engage in organizational activity inconsistent
with the rights created by the act. These factors suggest that enforceability
turns not upon the nature of the agreement, but upon the status of the parties
to the agreement. Thus, all agreements with majority unions would be en14 179 F. Supp. 564 (N.D. Ohio 1959).

Is Morgan Drive Away, Inc. v. Teamsters Union, 166 F. Supp. 885 (S.D. Ind. 1958),
aff'd, 268 F.2d 871 (7th Cir. 1959); Textile Workers Union v. Arista Mills Co., 193 F.2d
529 (4th Cir. 1951).
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forceable; whereas agreements with minority unions would be unenforceable
where the possibility of conflict exists with the rights and duties of a majority
union.16 Where there is no majority union, as in Retail Clerks, the possibility
of such conflict does not exist. In such cases there appears to be no basis
for denying enforcement to agreements. The likelihood that a minority
union may become the bargaining representative makes applicable all the
arguments for enforcement based upon the psychological impact of breach
on the parties' relationship.
A restrictive view of the agreements enforceable under section 301 was
also taken by Judge Wyzanski in the Potter Press case.17 There the court
refused to enforce an arbitration agreement-a so-called legislative agreement in which the terms of the agreement are determined by the arbitrator-principally on the ground that the United States Arbitration Act
did not allow the federal courts to enforce such agreements. Because the
Supreme Court did not rely upon the Arbitration Act in Lincoln Mills,
it may be inferred that there is no basis for distinguishing between grievance
arbitration clauses and the broader clause involved in Potter Press.'s The
Court has largely resisted the Board's attempts to impose its judgment of
the propriety of substantive terms upon the parties. 19 This approval of freedom
of contract seems contrary to the Potter Press approach and suggests that
the scope of enforceable arbitration agreements is a matter to be determined
through the bargaining process.
Tort claims are, of course, not cognizable under the section since no
contract violation is involved. 20 Stenzel & Co. v. Department Store Union2l
suggests, however, that actions for relief from tortious interference with
contractual relationships may be joined with claims for breach of contract
on the theory of pendant jurisdiction.
The district court entertained a suit for conspiracy to interfere with a business relationship where the complaint also alleged breach of the contract
16 But see Douds v. Local 1250, Retail Dep't Store Union, 173 F.2d 764 (2d Cir. 1949).

17 Boston Printing Pressman's Union v. Potter Press, 141 F. Supp. 553 (D. Mass. 1956),
aff'd, 241 F.2d 787 (1st Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 817 (1957).
18 Potter Press was followed by a recent district court case, Couch v. Prescolite Mfg.
Corp., 191 F. Supp. 737 (W.D. Ark. 1961) (alternative ground), but at least one state case
is contrary. Amalgamated Ass'n of Elec. Ry. Employees v. Pittsburgh Rys. Co., 393 Pa.
219, 142 A.2d 734 (1958), cert denied, 358 U.S. 882 (1958) (enforcing an agreement to arbitrate amendments to retirement plan under the Pennsylvania Arbitration Act). See Meltzer,
supra note 5, at 274 n.208.
19 See cases cited note 88 infra.
20 See note 12 supra.
21

11 F.R.D. 362 (W.D. Mo. 1951).
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by one of the defendant unions. Although state law governed the tort claim, 2 2
the similarity of the issues involved in both the alleged contract breach and
the tort made disposition of both claims in a single litigation preferable.
The courts have divided on whether declaratory judgment suits may be
brought under section 301 and the Declaratory Judgments Act. The Declaratory Judgments Act confers jurisdiction to render declaratory relief where
the court would otherwise have no jurisdiction over the case. 23 Courts emphasizing the "violation" language of section 301 have refused to entertain such
suits, reasoning that section 301 conferred jurisdiction only over contract
violations. 24 A fortiori, it is said, declaratory judgments may not be rendered
since no violation of the agreement is involved. Other courts, following the
lead of the First Circuit, have entertained such actions. 25 The lack of clarity
in the legislative history undermines the technical construction given the
section by courts denying declaratory relief, since the violation language,
for all that appears, was largely fortuitous. Despite the mandate found in
Lincoln Mills to create substantive law, Congress intended merely to make
unions readily suable in the federal courts. There is no indication that Congress, had it considered the problem of declaratory relief, would have refused
22

In Sinclair Ref. Co. v. Atkinson, 48 L.R.R.M. 2045 (6th Cir. 1961), an employer
brought an action for damages against the union for breach of a no-strike clause under
section 301, and claims against the officers of the union for breach of contract and inducement of breach by their fellow employees. Jurisdiction under the second count was based
upon diversity of citizenship. The trial court dismissed the second count against the individuals on the ground that section 301 barred personal liability for union officers. The Court
of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that the court properly had jurisdiction over the claim
against the individual defendants who were liable both for the damages resulting from their
individual breach of their agreement not to strike, and for inducing breach by the other
members of the union. This latter claim was, in the court's view, governed by state law.
This result appears contrary to the provision in section 301(b) that only the union as an
entity shall be responsible for damages arising out of breach of the collective bargaining
agreement.
23 28 U.S.C. §2201 (1958).
Z4 Ferguson-Steere Motor Co. v. Teamsters Union, 223 F.2d 842 (5th Cir. 1955). Cf.
Mengel Co. v. Nashville Paper Prod. & Specialty Workers Union, 221 F.2d 644 (6th Cir.
1955); Hall v. Sperry Gyroscope Co., 183 F. Supp. 891 (S.D.N.Y. 1960); Wamsutta Mills
v. Pollock, 180 F. Supp. 826 (S.D.N.Y. 1959); International News Serv. v. Gereczy, 160
F. Supp. 5 (S.D.N.Y. 1958). These latter cases involved suits to stay arbitration and were
held not cognizable since compliance with the contract was alleged.
25 The majority of courts directly faced with declaratory judgment suits have held that
section 301 confers jurisdiction to entertain the action. In re Jacobson, 161 F. Supp. 222
(D. Mass. 1958), rev'd and remanded sub nom. Boston Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Insurance
Agents' Union, 258 F.2d 516 (lst Cir. 1958); New Bedford Defense Prods. Div. v. Local
1113, UAW, 160 F. Supp. 103 (D. Mass. 1958), aff'd, 258 F.2d 522 (1st Cir. 1958); Pittsburgh Rys. Co. v. Amalgamated Ass'n of Elec. Ry. Employees, 176 F. Supp. 16 (W.D.
Pa. 1959); Modine Mfg. Co. v. Grand Lodge Int'l Ass'n of Machinists., 216 F.2d 326 (6th
Cir. 1954); Weyerhaeuser Co. v. International Bhd. of Pulp Workers, 190 F. Supp. 196
(D. Me. 1960).
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to permit such suits to be entertained. 26 Collective bargaining agreements
are frequently amgibuous, and the rights of the parties unclear. Moreover,
the formal parties to such agreements change, as, for example, when a signatory union is decertified, and another bargaining representative is selected
by the employees. In such a case the rights of the parties are placed in doubt,
and a judicial proceeding to determine the rights of the former parties and
the incoming union would simplify the transition. 27 Because of the utility
of the device and the apparent absence of a specific congressional purpose,
suits for declaratory relief should be allowed.
A similar problem has arisen with regard to suits to stay arbitration.
Under one view such suits are not predicated upon "violations" of the agreement because the moving party alleges compliance with the agreement. 2 8
Here, too, a less technical approach to the language seems more appropriate
since the federal courts are the proper forum for the litigation of collective
bargaining disputes. Coupled with the rule that federal courts will not review
the merits of arbitration awards, 29 refusal to entertain3 0 or to permit removal 3 '
of suits to stay arbitration in effect precludes the parties from securing a federal
32
forum for the determination of their rights under the agreement.
26 Cf. Prudential Ins. Co. v. Insurance Agents' Union, 169 F. Supp. 534 (S.D.N.Y.
1959). Judge Dimock suggests that the purpose of section 301 is to reduce industrial strife
through the processes of judicial settlement and urges a liberal construction of section 301.
Accord, Local 28, IBEW v. Maryland Chapter, NECA, 48 L.R.R.M. 2031 (D. Md. 1961).
27 See, e.g., Modine Mfg. Co. v. Grand Lodge Int'l Ass'n of Machinists, 176 F. Supp.
16 (W.D. Pa. 1959).
28 Hall v. Sperry Gyroscope Co., 183 F. Supp. 891 (S.D.N.Y. 1960); Wamsutta Mills
v. Pollock, 180 F. Supp. 826 (S.D.N.Y. 1959); International News Serv. v. Gereczy, 160
F. Supp. 5 (S.D.N.Y. 1958). In Mengel Co. v. Nashville Paper Prod. & Specialty Workers
Union, 221 F.2d 644 (6th Cir. 1955), the suit was brought to declare an arbitration award
invalid. The court refused to entertain the action since no contract violation was involved.
In Children's Dress Union, Local 91 v. Frankow Mfg. Co., 183 F. Supp. 671 (S.D.N.Y.
1960), the district court held that a suit filed in the state court to stay arbitration pursuant
to the New York arbitration law was a suit within section 301 for purposes of removal. The
case was remanded, however, because the removing union was the plaintiff in the action
under New York law, and could not remove the action under section 1441. See also Minkoff
v. Scranton Frocks, Inc. 172 F. Supp. 870 (S.D.N.Y. 1959) (action to enforce arbitration
award held within the meaning of section 301); Minkoff v. Budget Dress Corp., 180 F.
Supp. 818 (S.D.N.Y. 1960). (Suit to enforce arbitration award remanded for untimely
motion to remove.)
In Ingraham Co. v. Local 260, Radio & Mach. Workers Union, 171 F. Supp. 102
(D. Conn. 1959) the district court allowed removal of an action to modify an arbitrator's
award, indicating that in its opinion either party to an arbitration award could properly
remove the action from a state court.
29 See infra at p. 731.
30 See note 28 supra.

31 Ibid.
32 This problem will be especially acute if state law is not superseded by federal law in
suits brought in the state courts. See generally Meltzer, supra note 5, for a review of the
conflicting policies involved in federal-state preemption in this area.
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It has been widely held that individuals may neither sue nor be sued under
section 301.33 The language of the section does not compel this result. The
phrase, "between an employer and a labor organization," may be read to
modify either "suits" or "contracts." Although either construction is plausible
on the face of the statute, the courts have read the language to modify "suits"
and have concluded that individuals lack standing under the section. This
result is justifiable on policy grounds and is consistent with the statute read
as a whole. Permitting individuals to bring actions under section 301 would
impair the union's right to administer the agreement. Moreover, the express
authorization in section 301(b) for unions to sue "in behalf of the employees"
implies that the union is the proper party to bring 301 actions. In view of
the purpose manifest in the legislative history to make unions, as entities,
responsible for their contracts, the courts' construction appears reasonable.
Absent standing by individual members, only unions as entities may sue under
301, and a class action on behalf of the members of the union does not
34
create jurisdiction.
Problems of the employers' standing to sue have centered around situations
in which the collective bargaining agreement was entered into by an employers'
association. Two courts have permitted individual employers to sue on contracts entered into on their behalf by the association,3 5 and a third court has
permitted the association to bring the action itself.36 According to the law
of agency, a contracting association is either an agent acting on behalf of the
individual employers or is itself a principal. Logically, these legal relationships
are mutually exclusive; either an individual employer or the association has
the right to bring a 301 action, but not both. Although the three cases can
be reconciled on their facts under either theory, agency law itself seems
inapplicable. Voluntary selection of a multi-employer bargaining unit, which
reflects custom or the practical necessities of bargaining in a particular industry, should not affect the capacity to sue under section 301. Either individual employers or the association should be considered real parties in interest
for purposes of suit, and the selection of the plaintiff should be left to the
discretion of the parties.
33 Morgan Drive Away, Inc. v. Teamsters Union, 166 F. Supp. 885 (S.D.Ind. 1958),
aff'd, 268 F.2d 817 (7th Cir. 1959); Rock Drilling Union v. Mason & Hanger Co., 217
F.2d 687 (2d Cir. 1954); Sinclair Ref. Co. v. Atkinson, 187 F. Supp. 225 (N.D. Ind.
1960); Burlesque Artists Ass'n v. Hirst Enterprises, 134 F. Supp. 203 (E.D. Pa. 1955).
34 Schatte v. International Alliance, 84 F. Supp. 669 (S.D. Cal. 1949), aff'd, 182 F.2d
158 (9th Cir. 1950).
3
5 Teamsters Union v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 270 F.2d 530 (9th Cir. 1959); Farina
Bros. Co. v. United Bhd. of Carpenters, 152 F. Supp. 423 (D. Mass. 1957).
36 Employing Plasterer's Ass'n v. Operative Plasterers Ass'n, 172 F. Supp. 337 (N.D.
Ill. 1959). The FarinaBrothers case, supra note 35, suggests in dicta that only the employer
individually may sue, on the theory that the association is merely an agent in signing the

agreement.
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One court has refused to permit individual employer members of an
association to bring suit by analogy to the inability of individual union
members to maintain a 301 action. 37 The disability of individual union
members to bring such actions reflects policy choices favoring administration
of the collective bargaining agreement by the bargaining representative.
The enterprise interests in multi-employer bargaining units present markedly
different problems, and since contract violations may affect only a single
employer, the relationships are not apposite.
Closely related to the question of standing to sue is the problem raised
by the distinction made in Association of Westinghouse Employees v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp.3 8between breaches of contract involving "uniquely personal
rights" which are actionable only by individual employees, and violations
affecting the union qua union. Westinghouse involved a suit by the union for
wages allegedly due under the agreement. The Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit, adopting an "eclectic" theory of the collective bargaining agreement,
held that promises to pay wages ran only to the individual employees and
could not be enforced by the union under section 301. Mr. Justice Frankfurter, speaking for only three members of the Court, 39 rejected the Third
Circuit's original approach to the problem, but reached the same result
on the ground that Congress did not intend to make individual wage claims
actionable under 301.
The Westinghouse distinction between individual claims under the collective
bargaining agreement and union claims has been applied by numerous lower
federal courts to deny jurisdiction under section 301.40 In the Pullman Standard
37 Ketcher v. Sheet Metal Workers' Ass'n, 115 F. Supp. 802 (E.D. Ark. 1953).
38210 F.2d 623 (3d Cir. 1954); aff'don othergrounds,348 U.S. 437 (1955). The courts have
always experienced difficulty in framing a legal theory adequately explaining the legal relations created by tripartite transactions. The collective bargaining agreement-involving as is
does rights and duties of employers, employees, and the union as an entity-is no exception.
The Court of Appeals was attempting to avoid the difficulty of framing a unitary theory
of the collective bargaining agreement by fragmenting the promises exchanged according
to the party they affected. Regrettably, as Mr. Justice Frankfurter pointed out, the complex
relationships created between employer, employees and the union do not admit of such a
simple resolution. See, Cox, supra note 10. For a brief history of the legal theories applied
to such agreements see Jaeger, CollectiveLaborAgreements and the ThirdPartyBeneficiary,
1 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REv. 125 (1960).
39 Mr. Justice Frankfurter wrote for himself and Justices Burton and Minton. The Chief
Justice, joined by Mr. Justice Clark, concurred in the result. In dissent, Justices Douglas
and Black presaged the Court's later decision in Lincoln Mills by arguing that section 301 was
a grant of power to create federal rules of substantive law. The "uniquely personal rights"
language is from the Chief Justice's concurring opinion.
40 United Steelworkers v. Pullman Standard Car Mfg. Co., 241 F.2d 547 (3d Cir. 1957)
(reduction of pension by amount of workman's compensation award); Radio & Mach.
Workers Union v. General Elec. Co., 231 F.2d 259 (D.C. Cir. 1956) (discharge without
notice); Textile Workers Union v. Williamsport Textile Corp., 136 F. Supp. 407 (M.D.
Pa. 1955) (vacation pay); Textile Workers Union v. Bates Mfg. Co., 158 F. Supp. 410 (D.
Me. 1958) (mandatory retirement); Local 180, UAW v. J.L Case Co., 185 F. Supp. 130

1961]

COMMENTS

Car case, 41 the leading court of appeals decision on the point, Judge Hastie's
opinion suggests that a union bringing an action under 301 must bear the
burden of demonstrating its institutional interest in the claim. This view
42
was sharply rejected in Local 90, Stove Mounters Union v. Welbilt Corp.,
where the district court entertained a suit to compel payments into
a pension fund. The court there read Westinghouse as eliminating only
individual claims for wages from 301, and not as establishing in all cases
a burden requiring the union to show its interest.
The issue may have been settled sub silentio by the Supreme Court in the
United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp.43 decision. Without
discussion of the Westinghouse case, the Court affirmed the judgment of the
lower court ordering arbitration of a discharge allegedly in violation of
the agreement. It is difficult to conceive of a matter more uniquely personal
to an individual employee than his discharge, and, since the decision contemplated the possibility of an arbitrator's award of reinstatement, the decision
may be read as removing the vitality from Westinghouse. The decision was
so read by the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Mississippi Valley
Elec. Co. v. Local 130, IBEW,44 where the court upon rehearing reversed its
(E.D. Wis. 1960) (vacation pay); Local 2040, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. Servel, Inc.,
268 F.2d 692 (7th Cir. 1959) (damages for discontinuance of plant operations); Kosley
v. Goldblatt Bros., Inc., 251 F.2d 558 (7th Cir. 1958) (jurisdiction based on diversityarbitrability of claim for wages); ILGWU v. Jay-Ann Co., 228 F.2d 632 (5th Cir. 1956) (pension and welfare fund payments); Communications Workers v. Ohio Bell Tel. Co., 160 F.
Supp. 822 (N.D. Ohio 1958) (strike time benefit and vacation pay credit), aff'd,265 F.2d 221
(6th Cir. 1959); Garfield Local 13-556, Oil Workers Union v. Heyden Newport Chem. Corp.
172 F. Supp. 230 (D.N.J. 1959) (suit to enjoin payment of pension fund after change in fundig reserve). Contra,United Constr. Workers v. Electro Chem. Engraving Co., 175 F. Supp.
54 (S.D.N.Y. 1959) (welfare and pension payments); Local 90, Stove Mounters Union v.
Welbilt Corp., 178 F. Supp. 408 (E.D. Mich. 1959) (pension fund payments).
Assignment of individual claims to the union will not avoid the Westinghouse rule. Silverton v. Valley Transit Cement Co., 249 F.2d 409 (9th Cir. 1957).
41 United Steelworkers v. Pullman-Standard Car Mfg. Co., supra note 40, at 552. Judge
Hastie implies that only suits involving the union's responsibilities as bargaining agent
may be brought under section 301.
42 178 F. Supp. 408 (E. D. Mich. 1959).
43 363 U.S. 593 (1960). In suits brought to compel arbitration of claims that arguably
are within the ambit of the Westinghouse rule, or to enforce arbitration awards with benefits
running to individual employees, the courts have not applied the Westinghouse rule meticulously. See American Brake Shoe Co. v. Local 149, UAW, 285 F.2d 869 (4th Cir. 1961)
(arbitration award of retroactive reclassification of work assignment); A. L. Kornman
Co. v. Amalgamated Clothing Workers, 264 F.2d 733 (6th Cir. 1959) (enforcement of
vacation pay award); Item Co. v. New Orleans Newspaper Guild, 256 F.2d 855 (5th Cir.
1958) (arbitration of individual discharge); Tool & Die Makers Union v. General Elec.
Co. X-Ray Dept., 170 F. Supp. 945 (E.D. Wis. 1959) (seniority provisions); Textile Workers
Union v. Cone Mills Corp., 268 F.2d 920 (4th Cir. 1959), reversing 166 F. Supp. 654
(M.D.N.C. 1958). But see United Steelworkers v. New Park Mining Co., 169 F. Supp.
107 (D. Utah 1958), aff'd, 273 F.2d 352 (10th Cir. 1959).
44 285 F.2d 229 (5th Cir. 1960). The district court noted the retreat from Westinghouse
in Lincoln Mills and granted enforcement to an arbitration award of money damages for
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earlier decision denying enforcement of an arbitration award granting individual employees monetary damages for improper application of the
contract wage rate. In its view Westinghouse is now overruled.
It is perhaps surprising that the Westinghouse approach was so favorably
received by the lower courts. Section 301(b) expressly states that a union
may sue "in behalf of the employees whom it represents." 45 Moreover,
Mr. Justice Frankfurter's critical analysis of the Third Circuit's theory in
Westinghouse pointed out the difficulty of distinguishing the terms of an
agreement which benefit the union as an institution from terms which benefit
only individual employees. As applied in the cases, however, the Westinghouse
distinction requires just this analysis, since the determination that the union
lacks a sufficient interest to bring suit necessarily is a finding that the interest
involved is personal to the individual employees. The critical weakness in thin
distinction is the assumed mutual exclusiveness of union and individual employee interests. The Westinghouse approach ignores the factual community of
interest between the union and its members, as well as the union's abiding
interest as the administrator of the agreement in the enforcement of all its
46
substantive terms.
These interests have been most frequently recognized in cases involving
the enforcement of arbitration awards, where many courts have disregarded
the nature of the underlying claim for jurisdictional purposes. The policy
of section 301 to promote the development of contractual responsibility
in labor relations suggests that Westinghouse be considered overruled. At
best the case was a holding action by those members of the Court convinced
that the grant of jurisdiction was unconstitutional. At worst it prevents
enforcement, as a practical matter, of individual claims under the contract
which are too small to justify individual suit, but which in terms of the
aggregate employee interest are significant. Enforcement of such claims by
the union either in arbitration or direct suit seems most consistent with the
language of the section and the duties of the bargaining agent under the act.
II
Hampered by preoccupation with questions of jurisdiction and procedure,
the courts have been slow to develop substantive rules of labor contract
law. The pervasiveness of arbitration is also a retarding factor. Much of the
litigation under the section has been to compel private settlement of disputes
individual employees. 175 F. Supp. 312 (E.D. La. 1959). The Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit reversed. 278 F.2d 764 (5th Cir. 1960). On rehearing, after the Supreme Court
decision in Enterprisecame down, the court reversed itself, per curiam, one judge dissenting.

45 "Any such labor organization may sue or be sued as an entity and in behalf of the
employees whom it represents in the courts of the United States." Section 301 (b). 29
U.S.C. §185 (1958).
46 Cf. Cox, supra note 10, at 6.
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in the arbitration forum. Nevertheless, substantive rules have begun to
emerge in some areas.
PRINCIPLES OF CONTRACT CONSTRUCTION

The courts have looked to the past practice of the parties 47 and the history
of bargaining between them48 in determining the meaning of the collective
bargaining agreement. The courts' practice in this regard is not inconsistent
with their approach to commercial contracts, but suggests possible conflict
with the parol evidence rule. Although it involved the enforcement of a
Board unfair labor practice order, the Boone County case 49 is perhaps typical.
The Board found that the union had violated the 8(b)(3) duty to bargain by
engaging in an unprotected strike in violation of the agreement. Typically,
the problem of technological unemployment in the coal industry has been
alleviated by retraining miners to operate newer equipment. In Boone County
a new job superintendent brought in two outsiders to operate loading equipment and the union struck. Although the agreement did not contain an
express no-strike clause, the Board construed the grievance provision, which
provided for the submission of all grievances to arbitration, as implying
a no-strike clause. The Board, extending its analogue of procedural due
process in the bargaining area, held that this amounted to unilateral action
changing the agreement and, therefore, a violation of section 8(b)(3).50
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, expressing doubt that
the union's action violated the statute, refused enforcement of the Board's
order on the ground that the rejection of an express no-strike clause during
the contract negotiations made the arbitration clause a "gentlemen's agreement." In short, the court rejected the Board's not unreasonable construction
of the language of the agreement by reference to the parties' conduct during
bargaining.
47 American Stores Co. v. Johnston, 171 F. Supp. 275 (S.D.N.Y. 1959) (retirement age).
But see Garmeada Coal Co. v. UMW, 230 F.2d 945 (6th Cir. 1956) (lax enforcement of
contract right not a waiver of an express contract term).
4s Maryland Tel. Union v. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co., 187 F. Supp. 101 (D.
Md. 1960) (pregnancy leaves and job reinstatement); Local 937, UAW v. Royal Typewriter
Co., 88 F. Supp. 669 (D. Conn. 1949); Bakery Workers v. National Biscuit Co., 177 F.2d
684 (3d Cir. 1949) (compulsory retirement); Independent Petroleum Workers v. Standard
Oil Co., 275 F.2d 706 (7th Cir. 1960) (arbitration of sub-contracting).
49 UMW v. NLRB, 257 F.2d 211 (D.C. Cir. 1958). Followed in Mile Branch Coal
Co. v. UMW, 286 F.2d 822 (D.C. Cir. 1961) (suit for damages for breach of no-strike clause).
50 Arguably the resort to economic pressure is a unilateral attempt to modify the agreement, since a strike circumvents the contractual mechanism, the grievance procedure, for
dealing with disputes. This approach to union action is closely related to the Board's
doctrine of employer bad faith demonstrated by such unilateral action under section 8(a)(5).
But see NLRB v. Katz, 47 L.R.R.M. 2967 (2d Cir. 1961). For a discussion of the unfair labor
practice aspects of Boone County, see ABA, CoMMrrrEE ON DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW
UNDER THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS AcT 71, 72 (1959) [hereinafter cited as ABA REP.].
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Two recent Supreme Court decisions cast doubt upon the propriety of
reliance upon the history of negotiations and prior agreements in construing
collective bargaining agreements. In Lewis v. Benedict Coal Corp.,51 a case involving the same national coal agreement litigated in Boone County, an equallydivided Court affirmed the Sixth Circuit's implication of a no-strike clause.
Perhaps more significant was the Court's refusal in United Steelworkers
v. Warrior& GulfNav. Co.52 to consider the rejection, during bargaining, of
union demands for limitations upon the company's right to sub-contract.
The Court refused to consider this history as relevant to the scope of a management prerogative clause, asserted as a defense to union demands for arbitration of a dispute concerning sub-contracting. The Warriorapproach was
followed by a recent district court case where arbitration was ordered over
the employer's objection that union demands for severance pay had been
withdrawn during negotiations.53 However, in Local 725, Operating Eng'rs
Union v. Standard Oil Co.,54 the district court distinguished Warrior as
involving a vague management prerogative clause, and held a sub-contracting
dispute non-arbitrable where union proposals for limitations upon subcontracting had been consistently rejected.
Little reliance can be placed on Benedict or Warriorin view of the special
circumstances under which they were decided. Benedict, of course, was decided
by an equally-divided Court and has no precedent value. Warrior was an
arbitration case, and the Court's decision may have rested wholly upon
5
the favored position of arbitration as a means of settling labor disputes. 5
Several courts have applied the parol evidence rule to collective bargaining
57
agreements. 56 In Local 600, UAW v. FordMotor Co., although it did not
rely upon the parol evidence rule, the court refused to give credence to the
51362 U.S. 459 (1960).
52 363 U.S. 475 (1960).
53 United Saw Workers v. Porter Co., 190 F. Supp. 407 (E.D. Pa. 1960). Accord, Association of Westinghouse Salaried Employees v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 283 F.2d 93
(3d Cir. 1960).
54186 F. Supp. 895 (D.N.D. 1960). Compare Maryland Tel. Union v. Chesapeake &
Potomac Tel. Co., 187 F. Supp. 101 (D. Md. 1960), where the court ordered arbitration
of pregnancy leaves and job reinstatement, but found it "hard to believe that the Court
means the positions taken and abandoned during collective bargaining can never be considered ... especially where a demand is withdrawn as the result of an agreement between
the parties." Id. at 108-09.
55 The refusal of the courts to consider such evidence in arbitrability proceedings does
not, of course, mean that it is irrelevant. The arbitrator may, and usually does, consider
such evidence in deciding the merits of grievances. The Court's views in Warriorprobably
should be considered as establishing arbitration as the proper forum for such arguments.
56 Teamsters Union v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 270 F.2d 530 (9th Cir. 1959); Local
600, UAW v. Ford Motor Co., 113 F. Supp. 834 (E.D. Mich. 1953). See also Communications Workers v. Ohio Bell Tel. Co., 160 F. Supp. 822 (N.D. Ohio 1958), aff'd mem.,
265 F.2d 221 (6th Cir. 1959) (partial performance of a written contract excludes proof
of an oral agreement subsequently made).
57 113 F. Supp. 834 (E.D. Mich. 1953).
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union's assertion that a lengthy and detailed agreement contained an implied
term not to decentralize plant operations. The parol evidence rule was explicitly applied in Local 839, Teamsters Union v. Morrison-Knudsen Co.58 to exclude
union evidence that the atomic energy installations at Hanford, Washington,
were excluded from a collective bargaining agreement prescribing the terms and
conditions of employment in Benton County where Hanford was located.
In Lewis v. Mears,5 9 however, a coal mine operator was permitted to testify
that the agreement was not to become effective until he received a .signed
copy from the union and that he had never received a copy, under the exception to the parol evidence rule which allows the reception of oral testimony
to prove that no agreement was reached. The Mears court concluded that
"the federal courts in fashioning a 'body of federal law in the light of the
national labor policy' have simply adopted and applied the common law
parol evidence rule." 60 The approach of the Boone County court belies this
statement of the federal rule. It should be noted, however, that Boone County
did not involve the parol evidence rule and is, moreover, justifiable under
the exception to the parol evidence rule admitting evidence to clarify the meaning of ambiguous contract terms. Since Warrior involved the arbitrability
of a dispute and the arbitration forum does not generally follow strict rules
regarding the admission of evidence, the degree of strictness with which the
parol evidence rule will be applied to section 301 contracts must be considered
an open question.
The courts have not imposed statute of frauds requirements upon collective
bargaining agreements litigated under section 301.61 However, where the
will be enforceable,
parties themselves stipulate that only written agreements
62
even a statute of frauds memorandum is insufficient.
Only one case has dealt with the problem of incorporation by reference
of extrinsic material into the collective bargaining agreement. In AFL v.
Western Union Tel. Co., 63 the union brought suit claiming that one of its
58 270 F.2d 530 (9th Cir. 1959).

59 189 F. Supp. 503 (W.D. Pa. 1960). See also Lewis v. Toth, 280 F.2d 422 (3d Cir.
1960); Lewis v. Mears, 168 F. Supp. 134 (N.D. W. Va. 1958), aff'd,268 F.2d 427 (4th Cir.

1959). These decisions were distinguished in the principal case as varying the terms of the
written agreement. It is a doubtful distinction on the facts.
60Id. at 506.
61Burlesque Artists Ass'n v. Hirst Enterprises, 267 F.2d 414 (3d Cir. 1959) (oral modi-

fication of written agreement); United Shoe Workers v. Le Danne Footwear, Inc. 83 F.
Supp. 714 (D. Mass. 1949). But see Hamilton Foundry & Mach. Co. v. International
Mach. Workers, 193 F.2d 209 (6th Cir. 1951) (dictum to the effect that Ohio Statute of
Frauds applies to section 301 contracts).
62 Local 201, Radio & Mach. Workers Union v. General Elec. Co., 283 F.2d 147 (1st

Cir. 1960).

63 AFL v. Western Union Tel. Co., 179 F.2d 535 (6th Cir. 1950). Where supplemental
agreements are contemplated, but not made, the situation is treated as if no contract
existed as to those points. Local 201, Radio & Machine Workers Union v. General Elec.
Co., 163 F. Supp. 741 (D. Mass. 1958) (arbitration not ordered).
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members was entitled to a pension under the terms of the agreement. Although
the agreement did not expressly include a detailed statement of the pension
program, article 34 stated that the company undertook not to abandon or
modify the program during the life of the agreement. The court of appeals
reversed the district court's dismissal of the claim, holding that the company
pension program was part of the agreement between the parties. Collective
bargaining agreements are often informally created and frequently involve
local variations upon master national settlements. A flexible approach to the
problem of incorporation by reference is consistent with the practicalities
of settlement and facilitates the drafting of concise agreements.
In construing collective bargaining agreements the courts have resorted
to implied terms where necessary to avoid harsh results dictated by the bare
language of the agreement. In Local 4264, United Steelworkers v. New Park
Mining Co.,64 the Tenth Circuit relied upon an implied covenant of good faith
on the part of the employer not to alter his mining operations in order to avoid
his contractual obligations to the union. The union had brought suit for breach
of the agreement and a declaration of rights after the employer unilaterally
ceased his own mining operation and entered into a leasing arrangement with
some of the employees to operate the property. Remanding for reconsideration
of the good faith of the leasing arrangement, the court of appeals said, "But
we think this construction of a collective bargaining contract ignores the
covenant of good faith and fair dealing which must inhere in every collective
bargaining contract if it is to serve its institutional purpose." 65 The court
took a similar approach in Local 795, Teamsters Union v. McMaken Transp.
Co.66 in construing an agreement containing both a no-strike clause andaprovision permitting the employees to honor picket lines. While engaged in an organizational campaign to unionize the employer's clerical personnel, the Teamsters Union established a picket line around the employer's establishment.
Truckers and loaders, already members of the union, refused to cross the line.
The employer sued to enjoin the breach of the no-strike clause. Affirming the
lower court's injunction, 67 the court in effect subordinated the clause permitting members of the union to honor picket lines to the no-strike clause.
The court's willingness to subordinate the picket-line clause may be read
64 273 F.2d 352 (10th Cir. 1959), reversing 169 F. Supp. 107 (D). Utah 1958). The substantive rule announced by this case-is that abandonment of operations in order to avoid
unionization is not only an unfair labor practice, but also a breach of contract. Compare
Local 600, UAW v. Ford Motor Co., 113 F. Supp. 834 (E.D. Mich. 1953). See Note, 74
HARv. L. REv. 622 (1961).
65

Id. at 356.

66 282 F.2d 345 (10th Cir. 1960).
67 The granting of injunctive relief under section 301, of course, presents a conflict with
the policy expressed in the Norris-LaGuardia Act. The courts have divided upon the granting
of such relief. See Comment, 72 HARv. L. Rev. 354 (1958); Comment, 25 U. CHI. L. REv.
496 (1958) (advocating the granting of injunctions despite Norris-LaGuardia).
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as implying a good faith obligation on the union's part not to make its own
performance of the no-strike clause impossible. Similarly, in Fruit& Vegetable
Packers Union v. Torvig Sealander Fruit Co.,68 a provision leaving discharges
for inefficiency to the discretion of management was read to require the
application of fair and reasonable standards. This approach to good faith
obligations is not dissimilar to the rules applied in commercial contract
cases, and promises to be of particular utility in the labor contract field where
agreements frequently fail to spell out in detail the standards applicable to
the parties' performance.
Litigation concerning implied substantive terms in collective bargaining
agreements has centered around implied no-strike clauses in broadly phrased
grievance-arbitration provisions. Several courts have construed clauses referring to "all disputes" or "any grievance" as implying a union promise
not to strike without first referring the dispute to the grievance machinery. 69
This construction remains in doubt, since the affirmance of it in the Benedict
case7 0 was by an equally-divided Court. Where the history of bargaining
between the parties indicates that the union did not intend to be so bound,
it is difficult to justify the finding of such an implied obligation.71 Although
the Warrior case indicates that arbitration is favored by the Supreme Court,
Congress has thus far refused to compel arbitration of all disputes. It would
seem clearly improper for the courts to accomplish by construction of
contracts the same result absent a clear showing of intention to be bound.
BREACH AND TEMINATION
The typical union breach is a strike in violation of a no-strike clause.
The difficult problem here is allocation of responsibility for wildcat strikeswork stoppages not formally instigated by the union charged with contractual
responsibility. 72 On the management side, a variety of actual or claimed
breaches can arise. Typically, these include refusals to arbitrate disputes,7 3
68 160 F. Supp. 623 (E.D. Wash. 1958). A similar result was reached in Local 205,
Radio & Mach. Workers Union v. General Elec. Co., 172 F. Supp. 53 (D. Mass. 1959),

where the contract failed to lay down any standards applicable to discharges. The court
nevertheless implied a requirement of "objective cause" for discharge and ordered arbitration. But see Local 201, Radio & Mach. Workers Union v. General Elec. Co., 283
F.2d 147 (1st Cir. 1960).
69 Lewis v. Benedict Coal Corp., 259 F.2d 346 (6th Cir. 1958), aff'd mem.,
361 U.S. 459 (1959). Teamsters Union v. W. L. Mead, Inc., 230 F.2d 576 (1st Cir. 1956);
Gay's Express, Inc. v. Teamsters Union, 169 F. Supp. 834 (D. Mass. 1959).
70 Lewis v. Benedict Coal Corp., supra note 69.
71 Cf. UMW v. NLRB, 257 F.2d 211 (D.C. Cir. 1958). However, resort to the'grievance
machinery arguably could be construed as a condition precedent to a strike.
72 See United Constr. Workers v. Haislip Baking Co., 223 F.2d 827 (4th Cir. 1955);
International Molders Union v. Susquehananna Casting Co., 184 F. Supp. 543 (M.D.
Pa. 1960).
73 See Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
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75
74
failures to check off union dues
discharges of individual employees,
76
or make pension or welfare fund payments. Two frequently litigated claims
have involved charges that a change in the location of an employer's plant
violates the recognition clause in the agreement or charges that a shut down
is a lockout. The courts have refused to find breach of the agreement in such
cases where the employer's action was justifiable as an exercise of business
judgment. The New Park Mining case 77 suggests that the test determinative
of this issue is analogous to that employed in employer discrimination cases
under the act.7 8 Unless the employer's action is motivated by the desire
to avoid his contractual obligation to the union, changes in plant location
are management functions and not subject to the agreement. 79 However,
the parties may contract to prevent such plant relocation and run-away-shop
clauses are actionable under section 301.80 Similarly, where an employer is
forced to shut down his operation for business reasons, such action is also
8
deemed a management function and not a lockout. '
Termination of the collective bargaining agreement involves problems
peculiar to the labor field because of the statutory duty to bargain imposed
upon the parties by the act. Section 8(d) of the act imposes a mandatory
sixty-day "cooling off" period following notice to modify or terminate an
existing agreement. This period was intended to provide a period of peaceful

74 See Radio & Mach. Workers Union v. General Elec. 231 F.2d 259 (D.C. Cir. 1956)
7
s See Local 937, UAW v. Royal Typewriter Co., 88 F. Supp. 669 (D. Conn. 1949).
76 Lewis v. Mears, 168 F. Supp. 134 (N.D. W.Va. 1958).
77 273 F.2d 352 (10th Cir. 1959).
78 See, e.g., Diaper Jean Mfg. Co., 109 N.L.R.B. 1045 (1954); Rome Prods., 77 N.L.R.B.
1217 (1948).
79 Local 2040, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. Servel, Inc., 268 F.2d 692 (7th Cir. 1959)
(dictum); Local 600, UAW v. Ford Motor Co., 173 F. Supp. 834 (E.D. Mich. 1953). But
see Newpark Mining Co. v. United Steelworkers of America, 288 F.2d 225 (10th Cir. 1961)
(applying an objective test based upon continuity with former operations and company
domination of the leasing arrangement).
80 United Shoe Workers v. Brooks Shoe Mfg. Co., 187 F. Supp. 509 (E.D. Pa. 1960).
81 Local 50, Bakery Workers Union v. General Baking Co., 97 F. Supp. 73 (S.D. N.Y.
1951) (shutdown of bakery because of drivers' strike). In Zdanok v. Glidden Co., 185
F. Supp. 441 (S.D.N.Y. 1960), the district court applying New York law in a diversity
case held that the shut down of operations at one plant and the transfer of the work to other
factories of the employer did not abrogate seniority rights claimed by the employees under the
contract by shifting the locus of plant operations. The Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit reversed, 288 F. 2d 99 (2d Cir. 1961), on the ground that the contract indicated no
intention of the parties to destroy the structure of rights created by the agreement.
The court reached this result despite specific contract language stating that the agreement
applied to employees at a specifically identified location. Judge Lombard disented both
on the ground that section 301 required the application of federal law to labor contract actions brought under diversity jurisdiction, and that the agreement did not con'template the continuation of seniority rights for employees following a good faith
relocation of the employers operations. See also Metal Polishers Union v. Viking Equip.
Co., 278 F.2d 142 (3d Cir. 1960) (reaching the same result as the Gliddencase).
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renegotiation, during which neither party can resort to strikes or lockouts.
The terms of the collective bargaining agreement may extend the statutory
sixty-day interval before the parties may resort to economic weapons. The
Supreme Court's decision in NLRB v. Lion Oil Co.82 may be read as invalidating such private restrictions upon the right to strike or lock out. In Lion
Oil the union struck more than sixty days after giving notice that it wished
to reopen the contract and modify its terms, but did not comply with the
agreement's requirement that termination follow sixty days after giving written
notice following the end of an initial sixty-day negotiation period. The Court
noted both provisions in its opinion and assumed that "at all relevant times
a collective bargaining agreement was in effect." 8 3 Nevertheless, the Court
held the strike not violative of section 8(d), although the majority opinion
did not discuss the notice requirement imposed by the contract. Broadly
read, the opinion suggests that compliance with the statutory sixty-day period
is sufficient, and that strikes after that period are protected by the act.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter, concurring in part and dissenting in part, would
have affirmed the court below insofar as its decision rested upon the union's
failure to comply with the notice of termination requirement imposed by the
contract. The Supreme Court's treatment of the problem in Lion Oil is equivocal at best, and the lower courts appear divided. The early Patterson
Parchment case, 84 applying state law, held that where an agreement was
extended by the parties pending renegotiation of the contract, the no-strike
clause was terminated by a strike following a bargaining impasse. However,
in InternationalUnion of Operating Eng'rs v. Dahlem Constr. Co.,8s the only
case squarely presenting the question, the court held that the requirements
of section 8(d) were irrelevant where the agreement provided for a cooling-off
period exceeding that prescribed by the statute. The court held that the strike
was a violation of the agreement because the union failed to give notice of
termination, despite the fact that the strike occurred five months after
the notice to modify had been given. It should be noted, however, that
Dahlem involved a situation clearly distinguishable from PattersonParchment.
In the latter case the extension agreement was reached during current bargaining when an impasse appeared likely. Dahlem, on the other hand, involved
the construction of an extension period written into the original agreement.
It is considerably more likely that the parties contemplated the application
of the no-strike pledge in Dahlem than that the union bargaining in an impasse
situation would relinquish the right to employ its economic weapons.
Two conflicting policies must be considered in analyzing the extension
82 352 U.S. 282 (1957).

83 Id. at 287.
84
Patterson Parchment Paper Co. v. International Bhd. of Paper Makers, 191 F.2d
252 (3d Cir. 1951).
85 193 F.2d 470 (6th Cir. 1951).
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problem. Economic pressure is the mechanism of settlement adopted by the
national labor law. Accordingly, private agreements restricting the exercise
of such pressure could arguably be considered contrary to public policy. This
position was indirectly suggested by Judge Aldridge in a recent district
court case 86 involving the arbitrability of a dispute concerning employee
discharges. The union argued that all disputes were arbitrable because of
the presence of a no-strike clause in the agreement. Judge Aldridge rejected
the suggestion that the union would be bound by the no-strike clause where
non-arbitrable disputes were involved, but held that the dispute in question
was arbitrable. Underlying this view is recognition of the basic relationship
between the exercise of economic pressure and the realities of the collective
bargaining process. This relationship suggests that as a matter of policy,
where a duty to bargain exists, the ability to make bargaining demands
effective requires the free exercise of the right to strike.87 Persuasive as this
argument may be, the history of bargaining under the national act has
emphasized the parties' freedom to fix the terms of their agreements without
government interference. 88 Under this view it would be inappropriate for
the federal courts to deny enforcement of termination agreements merely
because they are more onerous to either party than the obligations imposed
by the statute.
Under conventional contract rules material breach of contract excuses
further performance by the promisor. The defense of material breach has
been asserted in several cases brought against unions for breach of no-strike
clauses. In Ludlow Mfg. & Sales Co. v. Textile Workers Union89 the court
assumed that a material breach would excuse the union's failure to perform
the no-strike agreement, but held that a delay in commencing negotiations
following the union's notice to modify the agreement was not a material
breach. Under the MastroPlastics doctrine9 0 an employer's antecedent unfair
labor practices excuse union non-performance of a no-strike agreement.
86 Local 205, Radio & Mach. Workers Union v. General Elec. Co., 172 F. Supp. 53
(D. Mass. 1959). The court's cryptic statement can be narrowed to mere construction of the
particular agreement.
87 See, e.g., United Steelworkers v. Shakespeare Co., 84 F. Supp. 267 (W.D. Mich.
1949). Of course, management would also have the opportunity to exert pressure upon
the union through the employees directly if the contract is treated as terminated. See Mountain States Div. Communications Workers Union 17, v. Mountain States T. & T. Co.,
81 F. Supp. 397 (D. Colo. 1948). The Second Circuit recently held that unilateral changes
in the wage rate and conditions of employment during bargaining negotiations are not
per se refusals to bargain in good faith. NLRB v. Katz, 47 L.R.R.M. 2967 (2d Cir. 1961).
88 NLRB v. American Nat. Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395 (1952); White v. NLRB, 255 F.2d
564 (5th Cir. 1958). But see NLRB v. Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342 (1958).
s9 108 F. Supp. 45 (D. Del. 1952).
90 Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270 (1956). But see Resnauer Transp. Co.
v. United Marine Div., 112 F. Supp. 940 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
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In Mid-West Metallic Prods.9 ' the Board refused to apply the Mastro
Plastics rule where the no-strike clause waived the right to strike only prior
to the grievance procedure and where the discharge of the employee in question presented an arbitrable dispute. A similar approach was taken in Local
1055, IBEW v. Gulf Power Co.,92 where the court refused to mechanically
apply the Mastro Plastics rule in a contract action for breach of a no-strike
clause. In Gulf Power the union struck after the employer refused to bargain
about the status of certain supervisory employees. The company treated
the contract as terminated by the strike, and the union brought suit for a
declaratory judgment of its rights under the agreement and an injunction
ordering the company to comply with terms of the agreement. The company
counterclaimed for injunctive relief unspecified in the report. The court
held that the union was unjustified in striking over a relatively minor matter
where agreement had been reached on other issues involved in the negotiations. Mastro Plastics was distinguished as involving unfair labor practices
in the manipulation of the bargaining unit itself, presumably a matter of
greater importance to the union.
Because in Gulf Power both parties had breached their agreement-the
employer by refusing to bargain, the union by striking-the court applied
the "clean hands" doctrine and denied equitable relief to both. Although the
court's assumption that the employer's action in refusing to bargain with
the union over the status of the supervisory employees was an unfair labor
practice is doubtful, its approach to the impact of the alleged unfair labor
practice is sensible. Unfair labor practices vary in seriousness, and it would
be regrettable to permit a relatively minor or technical breach of a statutory
duty to justify complete abrogration of the contract.9 3 Consistent with the
concept of material breach of contract, the Mastro Plastics defense should
be limited to situations where the unfair practice is of substantial magnitude.
The wide-spread use of arbitration agreements provides adequate relief
for minor breaches of both the contract and the statute. Self-help remedies
should be limited where the Board remedies are adquate or arbitration is
available.
The courts are in general agreement that an arbitration clause may not
be asserted as a defense to a damage action brought for the alleged breach
of a no-strike clause. 94 The rationale of the courts in these cases is that arbitra91 Mid-West Metallic Prods., 121 N.L.R.B. 1317 (1958), appeal dismissed sub nom.
Lyke v. NLRB, 38 C.C.H. LAB. CAS. 65875 (1958).

92 182 F. Supp. 950 (N.D. Fla. 1960).

93 The Board emphasized the flagrant character of the unfair labor practice in Mastro

Plastics. Cf. ABA REP., supra note 50.
94
Teamsters Union v. W. L. Mead, Inc., 230 F.2d 576 (1st Cir. 1956); Lodge 12, IAM

v. Cameron Iron Works, 257 F.2d 467 (5th Cir. 1958); International Union United Auto
Aircraft v. Benton Harbor Malleable Indus., 242 F.2d 536 (6th Cir. 1957); Gay's Express
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tion is an alternative to settlement of disputes by strike, and that a strike
in breach of the agreement is not itself within the scope of the arbitration
agreement. It should be noted that all but two of the cases so holding were
decided prior to the Supreme Court's rejection of the Cutler-Hammer approach95 to arbitrability in 1960. The Court's view that questions of arbitrability are properly for the arbitrator casts doubt upon the validity of these
cases. Nevertheless, the Second Circuit in Drake Bakeries, Inc. v. Local
50, Bakery Workers Union,9 6 distinguishing its own earlier precedent, adopted
the no-defense rationale. Although this approach appears contrary to the
Supreme Court's decisions concerning arbitrability, as a matter of contract
construction the result is persuasive. It appears unreasonable to assume
that breach of the no-strike pledge is itself considered an arbitrable dispute
by the parties. The Supreme Court's approach to arbitrability may, moreover,
be inapposite where no-strike clauses are involved. Unlike disputes concerning
working conditions and the application of the collective bargaining agreement
to the plant routine, the primary issue in cases involving breach of no-strike
clauses is a legal one, viz., whether the strike is a violation of the written
terms of the agreement. Here the necessity for an arbitrator's expertise
appears less pressing, and it is not unreasonable to conclude that the court
is equally skilled in determining the scope of a no-strike provision. An underlying factor which may explain the courts' reluctance to shift the dispute to
arbitration is the fact that the party in breach has itself bypassed the grievance
machinery by resorting to the strike weapon. The policy favoring arbitration
as a mechanism for peaceful settlement is inapplicable in these cases.
Individual contracts of employment may not be asserted in defense to
suits brought by the union under the collective bargaining agreement. In
a suit brought by the union to compel arbitration of the reinstatement status

Inc. v. Teamsters Union ,169 F. Supp. 834 (D. Mass. 1959); Cuneo Press v. Kokomo Paper
Handler's Union 34, 235 F.2d 108 (7th Cir. 1956); Markel Elec. Prod. v. Radio & Mach.
Workers Union, 202 F.2d 435 (2d Cir. 1953); International Union of Furniture Workers
v. Colonial Hardwood Floor Co., 168 F.2d 33 (4th Cir. 1948); Radio & Mach. Workers
Union v. Miller Metal Prods., Inc., 215 F.2d 221 (4th Cir. 1954); Sinclair Ref. Co.
v. Atkinson, 48 L.R.R.M. 2045 (7th Cir. 1961). Contra, Signal-Stat. Corp. v. Local 475,
Radio & Mach. Workers Union, 235 F.2d 298 (2d Cir. 1956); Tenney Eng'r, Inc. v. Radio
& Mach. Workers Union, 174 F. Supp. 878 (D. N.J. 1959); Armstrong-Norwalk Rubber
Corp. v. Local 283, Rubber Workers Union 167 F. Supp. 817 (D. Conn. 1958).
95 International Ass'n of Machinists v. Cutler-Hammer, 271 App. Div. 917, 6 N.Y.S.2d
317 (1947).
96 287 F.2d 155 (2d Cir. 1961). The court distinguished Markel Elec. Prod. v. Radio &
Mach. Workers Union, 202 F.2d 435 (2d Cir. 1953), as involving a broader arbitration
clause. The tendency of the courts in this area to distinguish earlier precedents on the facts
appears to be a fruitless exercise in semantics. The impact of the Supremes Court arbitration
cases was minimized by the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in Vulcan-Cincinnati,
Inc., 48 L.R.R.M. 2008 (6th Cir. 1961). The court distinguished the Supreme Court decisions
as involving grievance arbitrability and adhered to its earlier precedent holding no-strike
breaches not arbitrable.
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of female employees taking pregnancy leave,97 the company asserted defenses
based upon the prior bargaining demands of the union and waivers signed
by the individuals at the time such leave was taken. Relying upon the rationale
of the J.L CaseLumber decision98, where the Supreme Court held that individual contracts of employment were no defense to the statutory duty to bargain,
the Court held that the claims presented an arbitrable issue. This result
followed from the fact that "Applications for pregnancy leave cannot be
used to limit or condition the terms of the collective agreement...."99
Illegality of the contract has been asserted as a defense in several cases.
In Local 420, Plumbers Union v. Carrier Corp.OO the union brought suit
for damages resulting from the employer's failure to perform an agreement
allocating certain equipment installation work to the members of the union.
Upon the complaint of a rival union also interested in performing the work,
the Board had previously held the contract provision unlawful as a violation
of section 8(b)(4)(D). The court held the contract unenforceable, but its
emphasis on the fact that the particular clause sued upon was itself the source
of the illegality suggests that other terms of the agreement were severable
and enforceable.lOl An illegal clause was held not to invalidate the entire
agreement in Sidele Fashions,102 and the failure of the U.A.W. to comply
with the non-communist affidavit provisions was early held to provide no
basis for refusing to permit the union to bring a damage action.103 However,
in United Steelworkers v. Knoxville Iron Co.104 the court refused to enforce
check-off provisions of an agreement found violative of the state "right to
work" law. Although the issue has not been squarely presented in any case
thus far, the decisions indicate that while illegal provisions are not actionable
they are severable from the main contract and other provisions remain en1 05
forceable.
In Lewis v. Benedict Coal Corp.106 the defense of non-performance of the
union's no-strike pledge and set-offs for damages resulting from strikes
9

7 Maryland Tel. Union v. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co., 187 F. Supp. 101 (D.C.

Md. 1960).
98 J.I. Case Co. v. NLRB,

321 U.S. 332 (1944).

99 187 F. Supp. at 109.
100 130 F. Supp. 26 (E.D. Pa. 1955).
101See Teamsters Union v. W.L. Mead Co., 230 F.2d 576 (1st Cir. 1956) (dictum).
But see, Local 1055, Electrical Workers Union v. Gulf Power Co., 175 F. Supp. 315 (N.D.
Fla. 1959) (ordering arbitration of a withdrawal of supervisory employees from an existing
bargaining unit).
102 Philadelphia Dress Joint Bd. v. Sidele Fashions, Inc., 187 F. Supp. 96 (E.D. Pa. 1960).

103 UAW v. Wilson Athletic Goods Mfg. Co., 119 F. Supp. 948 (N.D. Ill. 1950).
104 162 F. Supp. 366 (E.D. Tenn. 1958).
105 Cf. NLRE v. Rockaway News, 345 U.S. 71 (1952).
106 361 U.S. 459 (1960).
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were asserted in a suit by the trustees of the Mine Workers' pension fund
for payments due under the National Coal Agreement. The case is of interest
not only because of its disposition of the issues involved, but also as an
indication of the Supreme Court's approach to traditional contract doctrines
as applied to labor contracts. Under conventional contract rules third party
claims may be set off where performance by the promisor is conditioned upon
performance by the promisee. The Court refused to apply this rule to the
payments accruing to the fund under the agreement. The Court assumed
that to allow the set-off would deplete the pension fund corpus to the extent
of the employer's damages. Pointing out that pension funds involve the rights
of employees and their families, the Court concluded that the national policy
forbade the assertion of damages for breach of contract in such cases. This
result seems correct. Suits for non-payment of pension fund amounts seem
inappropriate for the litigation of non-performance claims and strike damages.107

The Court's approach to the problems presented in the Benedict case
indicates that the guiding consideration in 301 litigation is national policy
and not strict application of commercial contract rules. In refusing to attribute
responsibility to the pension fund trustees for the acts of the union, the
Court noted that the policy expressed in section 301(b) of the Act was to
limit the responsibility for union action to the union as an entity. This policy
was applied by the Court in preference to otherwise relevant contract doctrines.
Relatively few of the cases filed under section 301 have reached final judgment,108 and as a result the case law dealing with damage questions is inadequate. On the union side damage claims are usually asserted for failure to
pay the proper wage rate, or for back pay awards. Estimation of damages
in these cases present few difficulties since the wage rate itself provides an
objective measure.
Damage suits for breach of no-strike clauses present more challenging
problems. In Structural Steel Ass'n v. Shopmen's Local Union'0 9 the court
granted recovery of the employer's average daily overhead costs for the period
of work stoppage against a union striking in violation of a no-strike agreement.
The court disallowed, however, expenses for travel, entertainment and the
company's charitable contributions. A similar approach was taken in Radio
& Mach. Workers Union v. Oliver Corp.110 The court granted recovery of
See Note, 49 GEo. L. REv. 368 (1960).
108 Of 35 cases filed in the District Court for the Northern District of Illinois over a five
year period (1956-60) only five reached final judgment. Letter from Mr. Joseph Spaniol,
Jr. of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts to the University of Chicago
Law Review. Mr. Spaniol finds that his records indicate that the majority of 301 cases in
other districts are also dismissed or settled before trial.
109 172 F. Supp. 354 (D.N.J. 1959).
110 205 F.2d 376 (8th Cir. 1953).
107

19611

COMMENTS

47 percent of the daily fixed overhead charges where a partial strike reduced
production to 52 percent of normal output. No case has granted recovery
for lost profit, although it seems evident that such damages, if provable, would
be considered contemplated by a no-strike agreement. Serious difficulties
arise in this area if the conventional mitigation of damages and actual loss
rules are applied. The opportunity for an employer to increase production
after a strike and the fact that no sales may be lost as a result of a strike could
render the right of action for breach of no-strike clauses nugatory in terms
of money damages. Particularly where industry-wide strikes are involved,
the employer's loss, if any, as a result of the strike is difficult to demonstrate.
In Alcoa Steamship Co. v. Comerford"' a strict mitigation of damages rule
was applied. The union demanded the addition of more men to the longshoremen working crews; all but one of the employers complied with the union
demand and sued to recover the additional cost of operation incurred by the
increase in the work force. Alcoa refused to accede to the union demand, and
sued for additional demurrage and operating costs attributable to the union's
subsequent strike. Damages in the amount of the additional labor costs were
readily granted employers complying with the union demand. Alcoa, however,
was denied recovery of its costs on the ground that mitigation of damages
required the employer to comply with the union's demand and to sue for
recovery of wage costs. This result illustrates the difficulty of applying conventional mitigation of damage rules in this area. Unlike the commercial
contract the relationship between the employer and the union is a continuing
one. Acceding to union demands clearly violative of the agreement establishes
precedents in the working relationship and psychological expectations on the
part of the employees that may prove troublesome to the employer in subsequent bargaining. Despite the possibility that damage awards may constitute
windfalls to employers, the value of the damage action as a sanction and the
serious possibility that employers will be unable to prove real losses, such as
permanently lost patronage, suggest the propriety of a non-technical approach
to damage questions.
United Shoe Workers v. Brooks Shoe Mfg. Co.,112 decided in 1960, was
the first case awarding punitive damages under section 301. Without giving
notice to the union, the employer moved his plant to another town in Pennsylvania in order to avoid paying the union wage scale in Philadelphia. The
court awarded the union damages for its loss of dues, computing this sum
on the basis of the union's annual dues collection multiplied by an estimated
twenty year life expectancy for the company. The twenty-year period selected
equalled the length of time the company had already been in existence, and
the court concluded that it was not unreasonable to expect an established
firm to continue in existence for a similar period. In addition, the court

HI 17 CCH LAB. CAS.

65480 (S.D.N.Y. 1949) (unreported).

112 187 F. Supp. 509 (E.D. Pa. 1960).
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granted punitive damages in the amount of fifty thousand dollars-nearly
double the actual damages awarded. The court refused, however, to order
the employer to return his operation to Philadelphia or to reinstate the displaced employees. This approach is similar to that taken by the Board in runaway-shop cases, and apparently rests upon the assumption that to force
the employer to return to his previous location would constitute undue
hardship. In view of the court's finding that the employer reduced his labor
costs by fifteen to twenty percent, the superficially harsh punitive damage
award appears not unreasonable. To the extent that the award accrues to the
employees through the union such awards may serve as a basis for de facto
severance pay. Such punitive awards, however, might well be confined to
run-away-shop situations where the parties do not have a continuing bargaining
relationship. The award of harsh damages against either unions or employers
does not furnish an amicable bargaining and working relationship, although
it could be suggested that where a contract breach is so flagrant as to justify
such an award little remains of a harmonious atmosphere.
AGENCY RuLEs

Problems of agency have arisen in cases involving the liability of parent
unions for strikes by local bodies. Where, as is frequently the case in nationally
negotiated agreements, the parent international union is a party to the agreement, it is sued as a principal. In Boeing Airplane Co. v. Lodge No. 751, IAM113
the court held that whether the international union was liable in damages for breach of a no-strike agreement was a matter of intention; it
ruled that where the local union has the authority to strike without permission from the international and operates with substantial autonomy, the
liability of the parent, if any, was several and not joint. The court did not reach
the liability question, although it suggested in dictum that the international
was not liable, because the employer had elected to terminate the agreement.
In permitting evidence to be introduced that the international had signed as
a principal in United Packinghouse Workers v. Maurer-Neurer, Inc.,114 the
court suggested a functional test of the parent's responsibility. The court
indicated that where the local was merely an administrative unit in a tightly
controlled national union engaged in nation-wide bargaining, it would not
be inappropriate to hold the parent financially liable for the actions of the
local. Joint liability was imposed upon the local and the parent in the Morrison-Knudsen case, 115 where both bodies acted in concert in causing work
stoppages of construction projects. An opposite result has been reached
"'91F. Supp. 596 (W.D. Wash. 1950), aff'd, 188 F.2d 356 (9th Cir. 1951).
114 272 F.2d 647 (10th Cir. 1959).
11s270 F.2d 530 (9th Cir. 1959).
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in cases which appear to have involved clear instances of wild-cat strikes."6
Responsibility in these cases properly, and necessarily, turns on the facts
of the particular situation. It would be intolerable to hold parent unions
responsible for strike action at the local level where the parent does not in
fact exercise control over the local's activity. Conversely, where a dominant
national union is involved it would be improper to insulate the parent from
financial responsibility for its own acts. Although the parent's signatory status
with regard to the agreement could be considered analogous to that of a
surety guaranteeing performance, such a view, as a rule of law, appears
too mechanical. The factual approach of the courts in this area appears to
be a sensible response to the realities of existing union organization.
The converse situation-the imposition of contract responsibility upon
bogus successor employers-has been less skillfully handled. Two recent
cases brought under the United States Arbitration Act illustrate the problem."17 In both, the district court refused to join alleged successor
enterprises in suits for arbitration of severance allowance brought under the
collective bargaining agreement against the former employer. Although the
cases may be correct on their facts, the courts' mechanical disposition of the
claims on the ground that the successors were not parties to the agreement
is unsatisfactory. Such an approach facilitates the use of run-away-shop
devices, leaving hollow corporate shells as the suable entity. Where substantial
identity exists between the shareholders of the contracting employer and the
successor business, courts should enforce contractual responsibility upon
the successor.11 8
ARBITRATION

Litigation under section 301 has frequently involved the problems of
arbitration. Much of the law developed in the federal courts concerning the
arbitrability of disputes was rendered obsolete by an important trio of
decisions rendered by the Supreme Court in 1960.119 Prior to these decisions
116 Garmeada Coal Co. v. UMW, 230 F.2d 945 (6th Cir. 1956); United Constr. Workers
v. Haislip Baking Co., 223 F.2d 872 (4th Cir. 1955).
117 Livingston v. Gindoff Textile Corp., 191 F. Supp. 134 (S.D.N.Y. 1961); Office
Employees Union v. Ward-Garcia Corp., 190 F. Supp. 448 (S.D.N.Y. 1961). In Gindoff
the court was careful to point out that none of the majority shareholders in the predecessor

corporation were participants in the new enterprise. Whether this is a question more appropriately submitted to the arbitrator might be argued.
1I Cf. Steel Workers Union v. New Park Mining Co., 273 F.2d 352 (10th Cir. 1959);
NLRB v. Lewis, 246 F.2d 886 (9th Cir. 1957). In Pepper & Potter, Inc. v. Local 977, UAW,
103 F. Supp. 684 (S.D.N.Y. 1952), the court disregarded a disclaimer of representation
by the union, and a disavowal of the union by the employees in a damage action brought
for non-performance of an existing contract.
119 Steelworkers Union v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); Steelworkers Union
v. Warrior & Gulf Nay. Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); Steelworkers Union v. Enterprise Wheel
& Car Co., 363 U.S. 593 (1960).

732

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 28:707

the federal courts had tended to adopt the so-called Cutler-Hammerapproach
to arbitrability.120 In that case the New York court ruled that arbitrability
was a matter of contract. Consequently, the court held that the arbitrability
of disputes was in the first instance an issue for the court as a question of
contract construction. The Supreme Court, while paying lip service to the
contractual basis of the duty to arbitrate disputes,121 conclusively rejected
the application of Cutler-Hammerto suits to compel arbitration in the federal
courts. The rule of the cases is clear-the allegation that a dispute exists
concerning the meaning or application of any of the terms of the collective
agreement, provides a sufficient basis for the federal courts to order arbitra22
tion.1
The effect of these cases upon procedural arbitrability remains unsettled.
Judge Wyzanski early suggested that compliance with the procedural requirements of arbitration clauses was a matter within the competence of the arbitrator.123 Courts following the Cutler-Hammer doctrine were quick to reject
this approach,124 but the more recent cases have submitted questions of
procedural arbitrability to the arbitrator.125 It should be noted, however,
that compliance with procedural requirements written into a grievance provision are largely a matter of contract construction. Unlike work disputes and
other typical arbitration questions, the industrial context is irrelevant to the
determination of these issues. The courts' expertise in construing agreements
seems to qualify them as the appropriate forum for determining procedural
compliance.
The Enterprise Wheel decision indicates that little if any review of arbitra120 International Ass'n of Machinists v. Cutler-Hammer, 271 App. Div. 917, 67 N.Y.S.2d
317 (1947); see Note, 10 SYRAcusE L. RaV. 278 (1959), for a review of the federal cases.
121 See Meltzer, The Supreme Court, 4rbitrabilityand Collective Bargaining,28 U. Cii.
L. REv. 464 (1961).
122 But see Portland Web Pressman's Union v. Oregonian Publishing Co., 286 F.2d
4 (9th Cir. 1960) (arbitration denied on ground of lack of justifiable issues).
123 In re Jacobson, 161 F. Supp. 222 (D. Mass. 1958), rev'd and remanded sub nom.
Boston Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Insurance Agents' Union, 258 F.2d 516 (1st Cir. 1958); Couch
v. Prescolite Mfg. Corp., 191 F. Supp. 737. (W.D. Ark. 1961).
124 Brass & Copper Workers Union v. American Brass Co., 172 F. Supp. 465 (E.D.
Wis. 1959); International Union of Operating Eng'rs v. Monsanto Chem. Co., 164 F.
Supp. 406 (W.D. Ark. 1948).
125 Local 971, UAW v. Bendix-Westinghouse Co., 188 F. Supp. 842 (N.D. Ohio 1960);
Philadelphia Dress Joint Bd. v. Sidele Fashions, Inc., 187 F. Supp. 97 (E.D. Pa. 1960).
Contra, Vulcan-Cincinnati, Inc. v. United Steelworkers, 173 N.E.2d 709 (1960) (Ohio
Ct. App.) (applying federal law). See Comment, 70 YALE L. J. 611 (1961). The writer does
not report all of the relevant cases, but discusses the policy considerations involved.
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tion awards 126 will be attempted in the federal courts and that the older

common law view barring resubmission of disputes will not be followed.127
CONCLUSION

The number of cases decided under section 301 is still too few to permit
the statement of broad principles of the emerging law. Because the cases
arise in factual contexts where the determinative considerations may differ
for superficially similar cases, 128 the effect of precedent will not be strong
for some time yet. Moreover, internal disagreements remain unsolved. Lower
federal courts have reached divergent results, suggesting conflicting judicial
attitudes toward enforcement of collective bargaining agreements under

section 301.129 The Supreme Court remains itself divided: one camp espouses
the development of a specialized industrial contract law;130 the other places
greater emphasis upon conventional contract doctrines.131 The resolution
of this conflict and its impact upon the development of substantive law under
section 301 stimulates a continuing interest in litigation under this section.
12 6 American Brake Shoe Co. v. Local 149, UAW, 285 F.2d 869 (4th Cir. 1961); Howard
v. United States Rubber Co., 190 F. Supp. 663 (D. Mass. 1961).
127 Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp. v. United Steelworkers, 269 F.2d 327 (4th Cir. 1959),
aff'd, 363 U.S. 593 (1960); Glendale Mfg. Co. v. Local 520, Garment Workers Union,
283 F.2d 936 (4th Cir. 1960). Contra, Mercury Oil Ref. Co. v. Oil Workers Union,
187 F.2d 980 (10th Cir. 1951).
128 See, e.g., the discussion of the Patterson Parchment and Dahlem cases in the text
at note 84 supra.
129 See the discussion in text of the diversity of opinion in the lower federal courts concerning such questions as the application of the Westinghouse doctrine, the availability
of declaratory relief under 301, and the arbitrability of breaches of no-strike clauses.
NSO
See, e.g., Justice Douglas' remarks in Lewis v. Benedict Coal Corp., 361 U.S. 459,
468 (1959), and his statement in United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nay. Co., 363
U.S. 574 (1960), that "The agreement calls into being a new common law-the common
law of a particular industry or of a particular plant." Id. at 579. The view that the collective
agreement is sui generis is criticized in Meltzer, supra note 121, at 480 & n.68.
131 See, e.g., Justice Whittaker's dissent in the Warriorcase, supra note 130, at 585, and
Justice Frankfurter's dissenting opinion in Benedict, supra note 130. The apparent division
on the Court is reviewed in terms of the recent arbitration cases in Gould, The Supreme
Court andLabor Arbitration,12 LAB. L. J. 331 (1961).

LEX LOCI DELICTI OR LEX FORI?-CONFLICT OF LAWS IN
WRONGFUL DEATH ACTIONS AND THE KTLBERG CASE

"Few principles of conflict of laws are as well settled as that, in an action to
recover for wrongful death, it is the lex loci delicti which is controlling."' The
law of the place of injury has been almost uniformly held to determine the
I Annot., Death of Passenger-LawApplicable, 13 A.L.R.2d 650 (1950). See RasrATmNr, CoNFucT op LAWS §§ 391-95 (1934); 11 AM. JUA. Conflict of Laws § 182 (1937);
2 BEALE, CONnucr OF LAWS § 391 (1935); GOODRICH, CoNFrct oF LAWS § 102 (3d ed.
1949).

